Notice to SC Sheriff

Santa Cruz Sheriffs have threatened to enforce a highly unlawful void order to evict Clive Boustred form his home and homestead. This formal NOTICE places the Sheriffs on NOTICE in regard to the facts proving beyond any reasonable doubt that the order issued by IRWIN JOSEPH is void and utterly unlawful.

NOTICE 1. SHERIFFS ATTEMPTED MURDER OF CLIVE BOUSTRED:

On March 10, 2003 based on lies and deception by Anamaria Tichatschke and her lawyer Vicki Parry Santa Cruz Deputy Sheriff Michel MacDonald shot at Clive Boustred and his three and seven year old children. The attempted murder of Clive Boustred by Santa Cruz Sheriffs was without any excuse. The Sheriffs were in the possession of the following information when they shot at Clive Boustred:

Knowledge of the fact that Clive Boustred was returning home from the Santa Cruz Superior Court House.
After shooting at Clive and his children, Clive showed the Sheriffs the TRO and Verified Criminal Complaint he had just filed to prevent his ex-wife from resuming false police calls – the Sheriffs ignored the TRO and proceeded to maliciously prosecute Clive, placing him on under false arrest and filing false charges against him. This pattern of practice or maliciously prosecuting Clive following the murder attempt of Clive Boustred by the Santa Cruz Sheriffs has continued to this day.

The Sheriffs knew Anamaria Tichatschke (formerly Boustred) made false 911 calls as the Sheriffs responded to a false call she made on July 9, 2002 where Anamaria made a false claim that she was being assaulted. Anamaria was ordered out of the family home as a consequence and the Sheriffs were in possession of the orders showing this.

The Sheriffs knew Anamaria had a stolen million dollar life insurance policy on Clive’s life as reported to the Sheriffs on 2002_06_28 - Police Report regarding my Anamaria’s threat to Clive’s life and theft of the life insurance renewal notice made to Sergeant Jim Hart of Live Oak Soquel Sheriffs' Department - Case# 02-06194.

NOTICE 2. ANAMARIA TICHATSCHKE HOLDS NO LEGAL INTEREST IN PROPERTY AT 210 SUNCRES DR.

Anamaria Tichatschke (Formerly Boustred) was paid out in full for the home at 210 Suncrest Dr. Soquel, CA 95073 pursuant to the July 31, 2002 order that was Stipulated to on August 13, 2002 – included below. This payout took place more than five years ago following Anamaria Tichatschke being evicted for making false 911 and CPS calls. Furthermore, Anamaria owes Clive more than $300,000 in divorce settlement over and above the payout for the home. Over and above this amount Anamaria Tichatschke owes Clive Boustred millions of dollars in damages having failed to make any appearance or plea in U.S. District Court Case Federal Court San Jose Case Numbers: C0800546 and C05 00996 see http://www.libertyforlife.com/abuse/infotelesys_lawsuit_1stamend-0-index.htm

Furthermore, modifications to the Stipulated Agreement and Order could only take place with written mutual agreement signed by both parties in accordance with the Stipulated Res Judicata Order – no judge has any right to set aside the order:

1st Order P3L11: 19. Modifications: “21. Modifications: Parents shall make additions and alterations to custody and visitation orders only by reaching a written, mutual agreement, signed by both parents.”
2nd Order P2L11: 4. Modifications: “1. All previous orders not changed or amended by this order shall remain in full force and effect.” And “4. Modificatinos to this schedule may be made by mutual written agreement of the parents.”

California Supreme Court Montenegro v. Diaz filed July 30, 2001: In Montenegro v. Diaz, the California Supreme Court held that a stipulated custody order is a final judicial custody determination: “We hold that a stipulated custody order is a final judicial custody determination for purposes of the changed circumstance rule”.

3. Respondent, ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, will vacate the family home. Petitioner, CLLVE BOUSTRED, will commit fully to purchasing Respondent’s interest in the home within 30 days or the parties will agree to select a mutually agreed to agent and they shall list the house at a mutually agreed to price.

NOTE The home was paid off more than five years ago. Clive Boustred not only owns the home from paying out Anamaria, Anamaria has lost the home as a matter of Expoliation since more than five years have passed since Anamaria was evicted from the home on July 12, 2002.

The original order which is also still in effect: Sheriff, you need to enforce this order and return the children to Clive and prosecute Anamaria and Stefan Tichatschke for violating #18:

NOTICE 3. Commissioner Irwin Joseph is a primary listed defendant in a lawsuit Clive Boustred has filed against Santa Cruz County, the Santa Cruz Courts and the Santa Cruz Sheriffs.

BY LAW neither Irwin Joseph nor the Santa Cruz Superior Court nor the Santa Cruz Sheriffs have jurisdiction over Clive Boustred not only as a consequence of this active lawsuit, but also because of the outrageous behavior including the murder attempt of Clive Boustred by the Santa Cruz Sheriffs and the years of malicious prosecution they have subject Clive to.

NOTICE 4. GUARANTEE OF IMPARTIAL DECISION MAKER – IRWIN JOSEPH IS NOT IMPARTIAL

Clive Boustred by law is guaranteed an impartial decision maker. IRWIN JOSEPH as a primary defendant in the lawsuit Clive Boustred is prosecuting against the County in no way meets the strict mandate that judicial decision makers must be impartial. Furthermore, IRWIN JOSEPH is the subject of public ridicule by Clive Boustred’s DVD “The Dot.Bomb Conspiracy” which has been publically aired on Cable TV and publically distributed throughout Santa Cruz and of which chapter 2 is available on-line at http://www.libertyforlife.com/about/background_clive_boustred.htm.

The law is explicit, IRWIN JOSEPH can in no way what so ever obtain subject matter jurisdiction to judge any matter relating to Clive Boustred.

a) U.S. Cal 1952. “Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental of are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342 U.S. 165, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.

b) D.C.Cal. 1980. In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party before him. U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14. McClure v. Harris, 503 - 8A Cal D 2d-387

c) “Due process is not concerned with mere technical formalism, but rather it is the substance that determines whether a litigant has been deprived of it”. Vita-Pharmacals, Inc. v. Board of Pharmacy, 243 P.2d 890, 110 C.A.2d 826.

d) D.D.Cal 1975. At heart of any due process hearing is requirement of an impartial decision maker. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5. Ponce v Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635. - 8A Cal D 2d-386

e) U.S.Cal. 1982. “Due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities.” U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72 L.Ed.2d 1.

f) “Due process clause guarantees aggrieved party opportunity to present case and have its merits fairly judged.” U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.

g) Under due process clause, every party is entitled to impartial tribunal. Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184. - 8A Cal D 2d-385

h) Cal.Ap. 1982. Fundamental fairness, i.e. due process, includes right to present legal and factual issues in deliberate and orderly manner. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. White v. Division of Medical Quality, Bd. of Medical Quality Assur., 180 Cal.Rptr. 516, 128 C.A.3d 699. - 8A Cal D 2d-387

i) Cal.App. 1962. Due process requires fair trial before impartial tribunal, and such trial requires that person or body who decides cases must known, consider, and appraise evidence. Le Strange v. City of Berkley, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 210 C.A.2d 313. - 8A Cal D 2d-387

j) C.A.Cal 1983. Central meaning of procedural due process is that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372. - 8A Cal D 2d-387

k) D.D.Cal 1984. Opportunity to be heard guaranteed by due process is opportunity which must be granted at meaningful time and in meaningful manner. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. 599 F.Supp. 69. - 8A Cal D 2d-387

l) “Touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.” U.S.C.A.Const. Ammend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a). Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal.Rptr. 529, 24 C.3d 22, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 209, 444 U.S. 900, 62 L.Ed.2d 136.

m) “Due process is denied where the procedure tends to shock the sense of fair play.” U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. Howard v. U.S., 375 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d 1365.

NOTICE 5. COMMISSIONER IRWIN JOSEPH IS NOT STIPULATED TO & HOLDS NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO JUDGE CLIVE’S DIVORCE CASE.

Commissioners need permission form the parties to to preside over their cases. IRWIN JOSEPH not only does not have permission to preside over Clive Boustred’s divorce case, Clive Boustred has formally and repeatedly denied IRWIN JOSEPH any such right categorically denying IRWIN JOSEPH any right what so ever to enter this order into the record. IRWIN JOSEPH is acting without subject matter jurisdiction. See Santa Cruz Superior Court Case FL 16028 filings:

February 6, 2006: REFUSAL OF RULING.; SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY IRWIN JOSEPH, COMMISSIONER [CCP § 170.1].; VERIFIED DEMAND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS AND COTRACT. – the objection to IRWIN JOSEPH presiding over the divorce case having been immediately placed on the record as soon as IRWIN JOSEPH attempted to gain general subject matter jurisdiction. Repeated dismissals of IRWIN JOSEPH by Clive Boustred were repeatedly and unlawfully ignored by the Court and IRWIN JOSEPH. – the Case is blatantly clear IRWIN JOSEPH has no authority what so ever to preside over this divorce case.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 259.
Court commissioners have the power to act as temporary judges by stipulation of the parties. The jurisdiction of a court commissioners, or any other temporary judge, to try a cause derives from the parties stipulation. In the absence of a proper stipulation, a judgment entered by a court commissioner would be void. In re Horton, 54 Cal. 3d 82, 90 (1991).

(b) [Definitions] Unless the context requires otherwise, the following definitions apply to this rule:(1) "Subordinate judicial officer" means an attorney employed by a court to serve as a commissioner or referee, whether the attorney is acting as a commissioner, referee, or temporary judge. The term does not include any other attorney acting as a temporary judge

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ Rules of Court Effective January 1, 2008

Rule 3.1.10 Stipulation to Commissioner In some proceedings assigned to a Family Law department, the parties may be asked to stipulate that their matter be heard and decided by a Commissioner, acting as a temporary judge, including the power to punish for contempt. (Eff. 7/1/05) (Renumbered 1/1/06) (Renumbered 1/1/07)

(a) Each United States magistrate judge serving under this chapter shall have within the district in which sessions are held by the court that appointed the magistrate judge, at other places where that court may function, and elsewhere as authorized by law—

(1) all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners by law or by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts;

(2) the power to administer oaths and affirmations, issue orders pursuant to section 3142 of title 18 concerning release or detention of persons pending trial, and take acknowledgements, affidavits, and depositions;

(3) the power to conduct trials under section 3401, title 18, United States Code, in conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section;

(5) the power to enter a sentence for a class A misdemeanor in a case in which the parties have consented.

TITLE 18 > PART II > CHAPTER 227 > § 3559 Sentencing classification of offenses FELONY.

(a) Classification. - An offense that is not specifically classified by a letter grade in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is -

Rule 10 – Discovery and Civil Miscellaneous10.0 Discovery and Other Hearings by Commissioners, D. Stipulation to Commissioners.:

2. A party refusing to stipulate to a hearing before a commissioner acting as a temporary judge may:

b. present oral argument before the commissioner. Without further briefing or oral argument, the law and motion judge, or another judge assigned to hear the matter, must make a determination on the motion and issue an order.

NOTICE 6. SANTA CRUZ SUPERIOR COURT CASE WAS CLOSED ON AUGUST 26, 2008

Clive Boustred as Plaintiff withdrew Santa Cruz Superior Court Case FL 16028 on August 26, 2008 – the case was closed before IRWIN JOSEPH issued the void order. As Plaintiff Clive Boustred has the right to withdraw the case.

See: DECLARATION; JUDICIAL NOTICE; IN THE NATURE OF WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS; JUST CAUSE; COURTS IN DEFAULT AND LACK JURISDICTION; DISMISSAL OF VOID ORDERS; WITHDRAWAL FROM CASE. -

NOTICE 7. VOID ORDERS ARE OF NO LEGAL FORCE.

IRWIN JSOEPH’s Order to evict Clive Boustred from his home has absolutely no authority what so ever. It fails to meet subject matter jurisdiction requirements; it fails to meet impartial decision maker requirements; it fails to meet Constitutional guaranteed rights to trial by jury; it fails to meet factual requirements since Anamaria has no right to the property having been paid off for the property more than five years ago; it fails to meet judicial ethical requirements; it utterly fails to meet any legal or factual basis what so ever it is void and of no legal force:

“A "final" but void order can have no preclusive effect. "’A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.' [Citation.]" ( Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514 [55 P. 390].) (Ibid)

"[A] court may set aside a void order at any time. An appeal will not prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a dead limb on the judicial tree -- a void order." (MacMillan Petroleum Corp. v. Griffin (1950) 99 Cal. App. 2d 523, 533 [222 P.2d 69]; accord: People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 467 [89 Cal. Rptr. 290]; Svistunoff v. Svistunoff (1952) 108 Cal. App. 2d 638, 641-642 [239 P.2d 650]; and see: 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 7, pp. 4024-4025.)

“If a judge is disqualified as a matter of law, every order entered by him is as equally void under the new law as it was under the old, and no reason appears why the parties should be forced to trial before a disqualified judge, only to have the judgment set aside when it later appears that as a matter of law the judge was disqualified.” Briggs v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 215 Cal. 336, 10 P.2d 1003 (Cal. 03/31/1932)

"If the order is void, it may be attacked at any time in any proceeding," Evans v Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990)

"a void judgment, order or decree may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally" Oak Park Nat. Bank v Peoples Gas Light & Coke Col, 46 Ill.App.2d 385, 197 N.E.2d 73, 77 (1st Dist. 1964)

"that judgment is void and may be attacked at any time in the same or any other court, by the parties or by any other person who is affected thereby.". It is also clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court at any time.” People v Wade, 116 Ill.2d 1, 506 N.E.2d 954 (1987)

"A void judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally." In re Marriage of Macino, 236 Ill.App.3d 886 (2nd Dist. 1992)

"if the order is void, it may be attacked at any time in any proceeding," Evans v Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990)

"a void judgment, order or decree may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally" - The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. Vallely v Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920)

"Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal." Old Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Williamson v Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850); Rose v Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617 (1808).

A court "cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid." People ex rel. Gowdy v Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 385 Ill. 86, 92, 52 N.E.2d 255 (1943).

“It is clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court.” Old Wayne Mut. L. Assoc. v McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907)

“A void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally,” People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).

"A judgment is characterized as void and may be collaterally attacked at any time where the record itself furnished the facts which establish that the court acted without jurisdiction." People v Byrnes, 34 Ill.App.3d 983, 341 N.E.2d 729 (2nd Dist. 1975).

Motions to vacate void judgments may be made at any time after judgment. (County of Ventura v. Tillett, supra, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110.).

A judgment is void on its face if the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief that it had no power to grant. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a trial court by the consent of the parties. (Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668]; Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. Rptr. 408].)

The court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.' (For a discussion of the 1933 amendments to section 473 see Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal. 2d 563, 572 [107].

"Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. [Citations.]" (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 286, p. 828.).

Section 437, subdivision (d) of U.S. Code, provides that a court, on noticed motion, may set aside void judgments and orders. Courts also have inherent power to set aside a void judgment. (Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.)

It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the order. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Ibid; accord Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761

"[A] court may set aside a void order at any time. An appeal will not prevent the court from at any time lopping off what has been termed a dead limb on the judicial tree -- a void order." (MacMillan Petroleum Corp. v. Griffin (1950) 99 Cal. App. 2d 523, 533 [222 P.2d 69]; accord: People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 467 [89 Cal. Rptr. 290]; Svistunoff v. Svistunoff (1952) 108 Cal. App. 2d 638, 641-642 [239 P.2d 650]; and see: 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 7, pp. 4024-4025.)

“Motions to vacate void judgments may be made at any time after judgment.” (County of Ventura v. Tillett, supra, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110.).

“A judgment is void on its face if the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief that it had no power to grant. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a trial court by the consent of the parties. “(Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668]; Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. Rptr. 408].)

“Thus, the fact that a judgment is entered pursuant to stipulation does not insulate the judgment from attack on the ground that it is void.” In People v. One 1941 Chrysler Sedan (1947) 81 Cal. App. 2d 18, 21-22 [183 P.2d 368]

"Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud." (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 286, p. 828.). Section 437, subdivision (d), provides that a court, on noticed motion, may set aside void judgments and orders. Courts also have inherent power to set aside a void judgment. (Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.).

"It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the order." (Ibid; accord Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761

Time limitation does not apply where the judgment is based on a fraudulent return. (Washko v. Stewart, supra, p. 318; Richert v. Benson Lbr. Co., supra, p. 677.).

It is true that the statute of limitations does not apply to a suit in equity to vacate a void judgment. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, supra, p. 569; Estate of Pusey, 180 Cal. 368, 374 [181 P. 648].) This rule holds as to all void judgments, in two other cases, People v. Massengale and In re Sandel, the courts hearing the respective appeals confirmed the judicial power and responsibility to correct void judgments (in excess of jurisdiction).

NOTICE 8. BY LAW YOU MUST PROSECUTE IRWIN JOSEPH.

IRWIN JOSEPH is engaging in TREASON, the Santa Cruz Sheriffs must prosecute IRWIN JSOEPH. The facts are clear, there is no stipulation to allow IRWIN JOSEPH to preside over Clive Boustred’s divorce case. The fact is irrefutable IRWIN JOSEPH is a primary defendant in the lawsuit Clive Boustred is prosecuting against IRWIN JOSEPH and the Santa Cruz Superior Court. IRWIN JOSEPH does not have subject matter jurisdiction and is attempting to maliciously enter unlawful orders against Clive Boustred, literally placing Clive Boustred’s life, liberty and property in danger

Under 18 USC Section 2382. Misprision of Treason YOU the Sheriff are guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, if you fail to prosecute IRWIN JSOEPH:

Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. US Supreme Court - U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

18 USC Section 2382. Misprision of Treason
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both. AMENDMENTS 1994 - Pub. L. 103-322 substituted "fined under this title" for "fined not more than $1,000".

"Officers of the court have no immunity, when violating a Constitutional right, from liability. For they are deemed to know the law."
–US Supreme Court, Owen v. Independence, 100 S.C.T. 1398, 445 US 622

The US Supreme Court has clearly and repeatedly held that any judge who acts without jurisdiction is engaged in an act of treason. "We [Judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution." [clarification added]”. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 W heat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).

NOTICE 9. THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS SPECIFICALLY PRECLUDES IRWIN JOSEPH FROM PRESIDING OVER CLIVE BOUSTRED’S DIVORCE CASE:

As a primary defendant in a lawsuit filed against IRWIN JOSEPH, and as a subject of public ridicule in the Dot.Bomb Conspiracy movie produced by Clive Boustred, IRWIN JOSEPH has clear and obvious reasons to be biased and is precluded by the Code of Judicial Ethics from presiding over Clive Boustred’s divorce case.

Canon 1. A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.

Canon 2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.

Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.

Canon 4. A judge shall so conduct the judge’s quasi-judicial and extrajudicial activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations.

Canon 5. A judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity.

Canon 6. Compliance with the code of judicial ethics.

NOTICE 10. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONS 170.1 AND 170.3 PRECLUDE IRWIN JOSEPH FROM PRESIDING OVER CLIVE BOUSTRED’S DIVORCE CASE.

The Code is clear it is impossible for IRWIN JOSEPH to be impartial as a consequence of being a defendant in the lawsuit Clive Boustred filed against IRWIN JOSEPH and as a consequence of the published movie Clive Boustred made that ridiculed IRWIN JOSEPH, amongst other obvious reasons and facts:

(a) A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true:

(i) The judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests of justice.

(ii) The judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial.

(iii) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.

(B) Bias or prejudice toward a lawyer in the proceeding may be grounds for disqualification.

(a) (1) If a judge determines himself or herself to be disqualified, the judge shall notify the presiding judge of the court of his or her recusal and shall not further participate in the proceeding, except as provided in Section 170.4, unless his or her disqualification is waived by the parties as provided in subdivision (b).

(3) The judge shall not seek to induce a waiver and shall avoid any effort to discover which lawyers or

(5) A judge who refuses to recuse himself or herself shall not pass upon his or her own disqualification or upon the sufficiency in law, fact, or otherwise, of the statement of disqualification filed by a party. In that case, the question of disqualification shall be heard and determined by another judge agreed upon by all the parties who have appeared

NOTICE 11. CLIVE BOUSTRED IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL BY JURY FOR HIS DIVORCE CASE THE SANTA CRUZ SUPERIOR COURT HAS REPEATEDLY REFUSED THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT.

The Constitution is explicit a person is entitled to a trial by jury in any civil matter exceeding twenty dollars. The Judiciary Act is explicit that a person may not be forced into a court of equity where there is a legal remedy. Divorce cases in Family Court are categorically entitled to a Trial By Jury – furthermore Clive Boustred has filed evidence of recent Divorce Cases in California receiving trials by jury (see: http://oc-divorce.typepad.com/california_divorce_and_fa/2006/05/bren_vs_bren_ir.html May 04, 2006 Bren Vs. Bren: Irvine County Superior Court - Bren is represented by Daniel M. Petrocelli in the case, was set to go to jury trial in October see also http://www.ocweekly.com/ Orange County Weekly - Bren Vs_ Bren.htm; Not Loving Husband Costs O.C. Wife Dearly Divorce: Jury awards him $242,000 for her lies about desiring him. An Anaheim banker won $242,000 in damages Wednesday when a Superior Court jury concluded that his wife had lied to him throughout their 13-year relationship. Case may change property division rules. - The Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext); Los Angeles, Calif.; Apr 8, 1993; LILY DIZON;MARK I. PINSKY; http://www.18884mydivorce.com/ How to Behave in Divorce Court: If you or your spouse are unable to agree on the terms of your divorce, everything will be decided by a judge in a final court trial. You have a right to request a jury trial.;

The Santa Cruz Superior Court is flat out denying any parties in Family Court their Constitutionally and Judiciary Act guaranteed right to a trial by Jury. Sheriff, you are under oath to uphold the Constitution, by law and your oath you need to prosecute the Santa Cruz Superior Court for denying citizens their Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

AUTHORITIES:

Constitution for the United States of America, Amendment Seven:
“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.“

Judiciary Act (1789) SEC. 16.:
“And be it further enacted, That suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”

The CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA of 1849, ARTICLE I., Declaration of Rights., Sec. 9.:
“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions on indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.”

Supreme Court: Samuel Chase, Supreme Court Justice and signer of the Declaration of Independence:
"The jury has the right to judge both the law and the facts".

NOTICE 12. YOU MAY NOT EVICT ANY PERSON FROM THEIR HOME BEFORE THAT PERSON HAS RECEIVED THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.

The 5^th, 6^th and 7^th Amendments to the Constitution dictate that no person may be evicted from their home without first having their Constitutionally guaranteed right to a Trial by Jury.

I demand my right to a Trial by Jury in accordance to the Constitution of the United States of America.

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE. You are sworn to uphold the Constitution. If you have received any order to evict the person/s at this home, your duty is to follow the law. If any judge or commissioner has made an order to evict the person/s without giving the right to a Trial by Jury then that judge or commissioner is violating the most sacred laws of the land and is not only breaking the law they are committing treason and racketeering. If you are an officer of the law and have in your possession any such unlawful order to evict the person/s at this home you must immediately arrest any judge or commissioner who issued said unlawful order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1. “Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason.” U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 .Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) “Any judge or attorney who does not report such judges for treason as required by law may themselves be guilty of misprison of treason,” 18 U.S.C. Section 2382. Failure by you to prosecute judges or commissioners who are committing treason will also make you guilt of misprison of treason.

Oath Of Office "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my office and that I will protect and defend the Constitution of the United States from all enemies, both foreign and domestic, so help me God."

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated” (6^thAmendment), “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (5^thAmendment). “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved” (7^thAmendment).

NOTICE 13. NOTICE OF HOMESTEAD

210 Suncrest Dr. Soquel, CA 95073 is my homestead. Under the Homestead Act, I am protected from being evicted from my homestead. I demand my right to a trial by jury and my right to be secure on my homestead.

NOTICE 14. THERE ARE NO FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS

Despite Anamaria Tichatschke having no lawful interest in my home and homestead there are not foreclosure proceedings against my home and homestead at 210 Suncrest Dr. Soquel, CA 95073. By failing to plea or appear in the lawsuit I filed against Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo has forfeited any claim to the mortgage or my property. The Proof of Summons served on Wells Fargo is show below. Wells Fargo has completely failed to respond (how can they when the money these banks are lending us on our homes is made out of nothing and is part of one of the largest frauds ever committed. Note if you have a mortgage on your home you should consider joining CopperCards to determine the legality of your Mortgage. Regardless, you should become educated as to what is really going on in this Nation. The nation is under the control of the New World Order Oligarchy who owns and controls the Federal Reserve Bank and most of our government agencies. Please visit www.libertyforlife.com to learn more. You can also access the lawsuit I filed against the bank on the site in the Proof of Government Abuse section).

NOTICE 15. I CANNOT MOVE EVEN IF I WANTED TO

I have been driven into financial ruin and cannot afford to move even if I wanted to as a consequence of the malicious and violent assaults on myself and my children by this County which have been consistently ongoing since March 10, 2003 when one of your Deputies (who I understand has now been promoted to a Sergeant) attempted to murder me in front of my children,

I have nowhere to move to and no money to move, I have been unlawfully forced into a corner and have no option but to defend my life, liberty and property.

My father who lent me the money to purchase my home is the rightful owner to my home if I am killed he has recorded leans well in excess of one million dollars on my property – these leans are firsts as my father lent me the money to purchase the property in the first place.

I have no problem attending a Trial By Jury to settle the matters of my divorce and ownership of my home. I also have no problem in dealing directly with the FBI.

URGENT NOTICE TO THE SANTA CRUZ SHERIFF REGARDING ILLEGAL AND VOID ORDER TO EVICT CLIVE BOUSTRED FROM HIS HOME AND HOMESTEAD.

NOTICE 1. SHERIFFS ATTEMPTED MURDER OF CLIVE BOUSTRED:

NOTICE 2. ANAMARIA TICHATSCHKE HOLDS NO LEGAL INTEREST IN PROPERTY AT 210 SUNCRES DR.

NOTICE 3. Commissioner Irwin Joseph is a primary listed defendant in a lawsuit Clive Boustred has filed against Santa Cruz County, the Santa Cruz Courts and the Santa Cruz Sheriffs.

NOTICE 4. GUARANTEE OF IMPARTIAL DECISION MAKER – IRWIN JOSEPH IS NOT IMPARTIAL

NOTICE 5. COMMISSIONER IRWIN JOSEPH IS NOT STIPULATED TO & HOLDS NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO JUDGE CLIVE’S DIVORCE CASE.

NOTICE 6. SANTA CRUZ SUPERIOR COURT CASE WAS CLOSED ON AUGUST 26, 2008

NOTICE 7. VOID ORDERS ARE OF NO LEGAL FORCE.

NOTICE 8. BY LAW YOU MUST PROSECUTE IRWIN JOSEPH.

NOTICE 9. THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS SPECIFICALLY PRECLUDES IRWIN JOSEPH FROM PRESIDING OVER CLIVE BOUSTRED’S DIVORCE CASE:

NOTICE 10. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONS 170.1 AND 170.3 PRECLUDE IRWIN JOSEPH FROM PRESIDING OVER CLIVE BOUSTRED’S DIVORCE CASE.

NOTICE 11. CLIVE BOUSTRED IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL BY JURY FOR HIS DIVORCE CASE THE SANTA CRUZ SUPERIOR COURT HAS REPEATEDLY REFUSED THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT.

NOTICE 12. YOU MAY NOT EVICT ANY PERSON FROM THEIR HOME BEFORE THAT PERSON HAS RECEIVED THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.

NOTICE 13. NOTICE OF HOMESTEAD

NOTICE 14. THERE ARE NO FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS

NOTICE 15. I CANNOT MOVE EVEN IF I WANTED TO