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March 10, 2003 Verified Criminal Complaint Filed Before Sheriffs
Shoot At Clive & Children - Court Refuses To Hear Complaint or TRO
The Court has
consistenly refused to hear or consider this first action before the
Sheriffs shot at Clive and his children. From a legal due-process
perspective, nothing can be adjudicated untill this complaint and the
TRO Clive filed on the morning of March 10, 2003 before the Sheriffs
shot at Clive and his children are heard. And clearly Santa Cruz
County lost any authority to hear any cases after thier Sheriffs
attempted to murder Clive infront of his chldren as this is an automatic
disqualifier for bias, it's like allowing a murderer to be the judge in
his own trial.
Clive Boustred
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
210
Suncrest Drive
Soquel, California [95073]
(831) 476-4300
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY
OF SANTA CRUZ
March Term
|
Clive
Boustred,
Petitioner,
Vs.
ANAMARIA
BOUSTRED,
Respondent/Contemnor,
STEFFEN
TICHATSCHKE,
Respondent/Contemnor, |
CASE
NO.
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
[Penal Code
§
188, et seq.]
[Penal Code,
§
166(a)(4)]
[Penal Code
§
118 Perjury]
(TRIAL BY JURY REQUESTED)
(IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED)
Time:
________
Date:
________
Dept:
________
|
TO ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and SEFFEN TICHATSCHKE IN AND FOR SANTA CRUZ_COUNTY
AND/OR THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on _________[date], at the hour of
_________or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in the
courtroom of Department _________ of the above-entitled court, the
defendant will move for an order DEMANDING THE FORMAL DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGE SAMUEL STANDCLIFT STEVENS.
The motion will be made on the statutory grounds that to allow the
already disqualified judge SAMUEL STANCLIFT STEVENS will prejudice this
matter, and is in fact, prejudiced and biased, and it is factually
impossible so as to deprive the plaintiff of the right to a fair and
impartial trial and/or hearing as guaranteed and secured by the
Constitution of California Article I, section 8 “due process of law” as
well as by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution which impinge on the presumption of innocence and redress
of grievance for your petitioner and plaintiff to defend his substantive
rights at law.
The motion will be based on this notice of motion, on the memorandum of
points and authorities served and filed herewith, on the records on file
in this action, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be
presented at the hearing on the motion.
Comes now,
the damaged and aggrieved party Clive Boustred, who comes before
Almighty God and the above mentioned judicial powers tribunal, who
hereby invokes true law and thereby deposes and says and proffer’s the
following truth and facts in this Verified Criminal Complaint
for contempt of an ORDER OF THE COURT of the above mentioned Superior
Court in the above-entitled cause of action FL 16028..
COMES
NOW THE PETITIONER Clive Boustred TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO THE CONTEMPT
OF COURT against contemnors ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and STEFFEN TICHATSCHKE,
who have in fact, been in direct insolence and arrogance to the ORDER OF
THIS COURT.
DATED: March 10, 2003
____________________________________
SEAL:
Clive Boustred,
In Propria Persona,
Sui Juris
COUNTY OF SANTA
CRUZ ]
]
Affirmed: A True Bill
STATE OF
CALIFORNIA ]
I
PARTIES TO THIS
MATTER
AND JURISDICTION
1.)
I am Clive Boustred, a white Christian male adult of the age of
majority, who is not a fiction, nor a corporation. My status is as a
free Christian male adult, sui juris, not embarrassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment; a human being; a free man about the land with substantive
authority; a California state Citizen, a taxpayer who has status before
this judicial powers court, and was in the County Santa Cruz, in the
State of California for all acts and/or omissions committed by said
contemnors and thereby, comes before this courts lawful jurisdiction.
2.)
I give up no rights, and reserve all of them. I am a free white
Christian man living on the Land within Alameda County, in California,
one of the United States of America; with express and explicit
reservation of all Vested Natural, Inherent, Common Law,
and Inalienable Rights, whether enumerated or not in the Constitution of
the State of California of 1849; without admitting to any jurisdiction
of the Constitution of the State of California of 1879[2]; the Political
Code, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code of the
State of California, each one though enacted in 1872 were never made a
part of the Public Statutes of California, nor any amendments or
additions of any type to any of the foregoing[3]; without representation
of any attorney-at- law, but with assistance of "counsel" by Right
within the meaning of the Constitution of the State of California of
1849, Article I, Section 21.
3.)
I am fact, the lawful father
to my sons Richard Clive Boustred and William Frank Boustred.
Father has rights to
the Custody of child in preference to Mother. Child need not join a
Habeas Corpus brought by its parent to obtain its custody. Father
cannot alienate his right to the Custody and control of his child.
People ex rel Barry v. Mercien 3 Hill 399
See Also:
“[The Father] is, in
truth, the guardian by nature of his child…In England this power is
exercised by the king as the Parens Patriae, acting through the court of
chancery. De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 51,
cases cited, and notes…
See also:
The discretion to be
exercised is not an arbitrary one, but, in the absence of any positive
disqualification of the father for the proper discharge of his parental
duties, he has, as it seems to us, a paramount right to the custody
of his infant child, which no court is at liberty to
disregard. And while we are bound also to regard the permanent
interests and welfare of the child, it is to be presumed that its
interests and welfare will be best promoted by continuing that
guardianship which the law has provided, until it is made plainly to
appear that the father is no longer worthy of the trust. People v.
Mercein, 25 Wend. 72. Herrick v. Richardson, 40 NH
272 (1860)
4.)
I am in propria personal, sui juris, reprinting myself as my own
counsel. I give up no rights (especially the right to counsel)
in doing so, and reserve same.
5.)
Your petitioner, the greatly aggrieved and accused party in this
matter, comes before this tribunal under exigent circumstances
6.)
Richard Clive Boustred, age 7, 03/07/96 is in fact, my son; and
is an unemancipated minor coming under my lawful protection and care as
I as his father am his natural guardian appointed under law, and said
son was in the County of Santa Cruz, in the State of California for all
acts and/or omissions in this matter, and thereby comes under this
courts lawful jurisdiction.
7.)
William Frank Boustred, age 3, 01/21/00 is in fact, my son; and
is an unemancipated minor coming under my lawful protection and care as
I as his father am his natural guardian appointed under law, and said
son was in the County of Santa Cruz, in the State of California for all
acts and/or omissions in this matter, and thereby comes under this
courts lawful jurisdiction.
8.)
Contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, is acting feme sole,
and is a women of ill repute, an adulterer, having unclean hands in this
matter, a contemnor for all overt acts and/or omissions in this matter,
who was in the County of Santa Cruz, was a resident therein, and thereby
comes under this courts jurisdiction; and,
9.)
Contemnor STEFFEN TICHATSCHKE, is a usurper, a man of disrepute,
an adulterer who having unclean hands in this matter for all overt acts
and/or omissions in this matter, who was in the County of Santa Cruz,
was a resident therein, and thereby comes under this courts
jurisdiction.
10.)
I do in fact, have clean hands in this matter, while respondent’s
in this matter against me, have unclean hands
by their acts of fraud and their plan to damage me for the purposes of
profit and reward. As I have clean hands in this matter, my claims to
my own child of which I am holder in due course, and have lawful title
of my children,
that I am the preferred party not only by my status, but as a matter of
both law and equity: "By the civil law, the child of parents divorced
is to be brought up by the innocent party, at the expense of the guilty
party." Ridley's View, part 1, ch. 3, sect. 9, cites 8th Collation.
Vide, generally, 1 Blackstone's Comm. 440.
11.)
Note: all laws contained herein are only brought as they are
declaratory of the common law and the public law of this California
Union State in consonance with the Constitution of California (1849).
12.)
The “SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY” is a corporation,
acting in both their personal and professional capacities, who was
present for all acts and/or omissions committed against me within the
County of Santa Cruz, and was a resident therein; clothed under public
authority, and had knowledge of the law, as well as of the facts in this
matter, and who wilfully with knowledge and premeditated intent did seek
out in this matter in which to collude and conspire to disenfranchise
me using “best interests of the child” doctrine as well as other frauds,
under color of law, under color of authority, in which to implement
enslavement and disenfranchisement against my person for the unlawful
purposes of profit and reward, and thereby, comes under this courts
jurisdiction for all acts and/or omissions in this matter;
13.)
The COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ is a incorporated area within the STATE
OF CALIFORNIA and is the landmass as defined under the Constitution of
California 1849.
14.)
The STATE OF CALIFORNIA is the incorporated landmass within the
union of several States under the United States, and is the landmass
whose boarders are defined therein under the Constitution of California
1849.
15.)
Jurisdiction comes to the above mentioned judicial powers court
as it is a fact, that the State of California is an inseparable part of
the United States, and thereby, it is guaranteed a government Republican
in Form under the Constitution for the United States (1787-1791), as
enumerated under the Constitution of California Preamble and specified
under Article VI, et seq. as well as Article III, Section 1.
II
FACTS GIVING RISE TO CONTEMPT OF
DEFENDANTS
16.)
On or about March 9, 2003, at approximately 10:40AM, I did in
fact, meet with contemnor’s ANNAMARIA BOUSTRED as well as her
co-conspirator STEFFAN TICHATSKE, and a resultant planned altercation
ensued against me instituted against me through willful inadvertency,
force, surprise, and stratagem by the willful conspired acts and/or
omissions of said respondents in this matter.
17.)
It is a fact, that judge Robert B. Atack of this same court and
matter in case number FL-16028, did formally file a written ORDER In re
the Marriage/Matter of Clive Boustred, petitioner against Anamaria
Boustred, respondent. [SEE EXHIBIT ONE: “Recommendation re
Custody and Visitation” dated July 12, 2002]
18.)
]
19.)
It is a fact, that ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, had knowledge of this court
order and did agree to same.
20.)
It is a fact, that ANAMARIA BOUSTRED had knowledge of the facts
in this matter.
21.)
It is a fact, that said COURT ORDER issues under seal and by
lawful signature of judge Robert B. Atack, did compel, and mandate and
order the following orders which ANAMARIA BOUSTRED in overt collusion
with contemnor and adulterer STEFFEN TICHATSCHKE did violate the
following provisions of said ORDER:
Item 9. “Derogatory
Remarks: Parents shall not make nor permit others to make derogatory
remarks regarding the other parent or the other parents friends and
loved ones to the child nor within the hearing range of the child.
Item 10. “Fighting:
Parents shall not argue with, threaten, or insult one another nor allow
others to argue with, threaten, or insult the other parent in the
child’s presence.
Item 18. “Boyfriend:
“The children shall have no contact with Steffan Tichatske.
See also:
August 13, 2002
STIPULATION RE: TEMPORARY CUSTODY AND VISITATION AND ORDER THEREON (Case
No. FL 16028) Item:5. “Neither parent shall expose the children to
romantic relationships for six months from the signing of this
agreement. [SEE EXHIBIT TWO: TIMELINE, December 15th, 2002
entry] (Both children complained of meeting contemnor Steffen
Tichatske.)
22.)
It is a fact, that I did not precipitate nor fulminate this
altercation noted in item 16 above.
23.)
It is a fact, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED in direct
conspiracy with, and overt collusion with said contemnor STEFFAN
TICHATSKE did wilfully and overtly plan this altercation in collusion
with myself as noted in item number 16 above.
24.)
It is also a fact, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED has in fact,
made innumerable false charges and/or allegations against me, in direct
violation of law, and in bad faith to both me and the above-mentioned
tribunal. She is not satisfied with the court findings and court orders
which have issued in this matter, and seeks to overturn them by force,
fraud, stratagem and surreptitious design.
25.)
It is a fact, that this is a continued modus operandi of said
respondent contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED.
26.)
It is also a fact, that on or about March 9, 2003, at the
Homewood Ski Resort, that said contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and myself
did have a civil meeting between myself and our children at a planned
ski-outing at Homewood, in the County of Placer, State of California.
a.)
It is a fact, that no derogatory nor vituperative act and/or
omission occurred nor was instigated by my person.
b.)
It is a fact, that everything went smoothly between myself and
respondent ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and was civil and polite during our planned
meeting there.
c.)
It is a fact, that everything went as planned UNTIL
contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE did in fact, ski down before my wife and
children, within plain view to both me and my children—and did in fact,
insolently, with a planned intent to violate both good sense,
reasonableness, good morals and justice—did violate said Court Order so
established and agreed upon and did place my children in direct
jeopardy of bad faith actions and/or acts and/or omissions,
with no palpable regards to morals or decency.
27.)
Seeing my children in such direct jeopardy and in overt insolence
and disregards to said court order, I did in fact, rush to protect them,
in accordance with the concise rule of law, which was just and
reasonable. I did in fact, say directly to contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE
(without aggression) “Please leave.”
28.)
It is a fact, he did respond: “No, I am not going to leave.”
29.)
It is a fact, that was in direct contempt of said court order so
established by this court.
30.)
I did in fact, respond: “There is a clear court order barring
you from access to my children, please leave.”
31.)
It is a fact, that he, even though he had knowledge of the law,
as well as the facts, did not leave, and he then did willfully assault
me, rushing forwards within 12 inches from my face, and with great
aggression and taunting said: “I’m not leaving.”
32.)
Said contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE was in my personal space, and I
gave clear indication I was uncomfortable—but at that instant—upon no
fault of my own; an altercation did ensue of which I did not retreat,
and when it was over—did not pursue him, but rather simply left for the
safety of my children.
33.)
It is a fact, my children were two yards away—right in front of
my youngest boy William.
34.)
This did put me in direct ridicule in front of my own sons---and
I was in fact, under threat, and felt great fear and apprehension.
35.)
It is a fact, that my wife did in fact, go off to call what
appeared to be a set up—officials from the resort Homewood who
were waiting there.
36.)
It is a fact, that we were on the KIDS SLOPE—and the chances of
all five (5) officials from Homewood being there—is an impossibility.
37.)
Within moments, there was five (5) Homewood officials there, who
did attempt to prevent me from leavingagainst the better interests of my
children.
38.)
I did in fact, remove my children from harms way in accordance
with my rights as my children’s natural guardian appointed by law and in
their better interest:
“Where a father is entitled to the possession of his minor child as
against all the world except its mother, and where the father and mother
are equally entitled to its possession, he does not commit the crime of
kidnapping by taking possession of it.” State v. Dewey,
155 Iowa, 469, 136 N. W. 533, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478;
Commonwealth v. Myers, 146 Pa. 24, 23 A. 164; Hunt v. Hunt,
94 Ga. 257, 21 S. E. 515; People v. Congdon, 77 Mich. 351,
43 N. W. 986. State v. Elliott, 131 So. 28, 171 La. 306,
77 A.L.R. 314
39.)
Both contemnors had knowledge of the law as well as the facts of
this matter, and knew that they were taunting me by fighting words and
placing me under threat, ridicule in front of my own sons would force me
to illicit a response in defense of my self in front of my own children.
40.)
I WANT IT JUDICIALLY NOTED AND PLACED ON THE RECORD, THAT IF
CONTEMNOR STEPHEN TICHATSKE DID NOT ARRIVE AS THEY PLANNED, THEN; NONE
OF THIS WOULD HAVE FACTUALLY OCCURRED.
41.)
I also want it judicially noted and placed on the record, that
this alleged and I believe planned act and/or omission by her, is in
fact, the fourth (4th) time contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED has
attempted to have me arrested, or charged by police and/or other
authorities by filing false and/or malicious complaints.
a.)
Please reference [EXHBIT THREE: 911 Call Affidavit]
b.)
She agreed that I could take the children Friday afternoon on or
about December 15, 2002, she then refused to let me take the children
and she instead took off with my son William Frank Boustred in direct
violation of my authority and against our agreement, leaving my son
Richard Clive Boustred at his school. I waited there for the whole
afternoon, and she eventually returned at Six PM, with my son William,
and my son William did complain to me that she went to the police. [SEE
EXHIBIT TWO—Timelines] (She told me that “The police wouldn’t come this
time, but they would come next time.”)
42.)
On or about Saturday, February 22, 2002, when exchanging the
children at K-Mart in Capitola, my son Richard complained to me earlier
that she was going to take him on the ferry with contemnor Tichatschke.
When I asked her if she was going to take the boys in front of
Tichatschke she first refused to answer anything, then she said she had
a right, in direct insolence and disregard to said court order refusing
same under Item 18. prohibitions noted above. She then attempted to
forcibly remove my son Richard from my car, and he withdrew frightened
that she would in fact, remove him from the car—and I went and collected
my son William from her car and put him in my car and drove home where I
did in fact, write a report. I did call her as I was writing, and found
she was at the Capitola Police Department, talking to OFFICER BRIAN
DODD, Summit Community Deputy, (831-454-2440). I spoke to Deputy Dodd
and discussed the issues, Deputy Dodd handed the phone to my wife, I
heard her start shouting at me on the phone, she cut me off while she
was still shouting at me. It appeared that she was purposefully giving
Deputy Dodd a ‘show’ of the nature I had seen before were she expressed
all her emotions while telling lies. I tried to call Deputy Dodd’s
back, but I was unable to connect with him. I left a request for him to
call me back. I did not receive a call back from Deputy Dodd. I want
it judicially noted and on the record, that I have never gone to the any
Police and asked them to “arrest” her. It is clear by the fact, that
contemnor respondent ANAMARIE BOUSTRED has had an ongoing hidden agenda,
to attempt to have me arrested.
43.)
I want it judicially noted and on the record, that contemnors
have engaged in an overt enterprise in an continuing pattern in placing
forwards false allegations against me in a scheme to gain control over
my property, as well as my children; and they are engaged in a transfer
of wealth scheme in which to provide her with financial remunerations
she is not entitled to by the concise rule of law.
44.)
It is a fact, that on or about July 9th, 2002, (the
next night) that my son Richard, due to the direct acts and/or omission
of said contemnor respondent ANAMARIE BOUSTRED in attempting to call 911
to frame me for arrest, my son suffered so much stress during that
event, that I had to factually take him to Emergency Room with a severe
ear ache and other stress induced complications.
45.)
It is a fact, that I have continually acted in good faith with no
bad faith to respondent’s in this matter, that I have continually
offered her an olive branch to open a dialogue and continued access,
care, custody and sharing of our children, to which she has acted in bad
faith and in direct contempt of same. It is a fact:
a.)
On or about November 2002, I did in fact, allow my wife at her
request to have an “extra night” with the children, which I did grant
and allow, in exchange for me picking up my sons early on Fridays which
was agreeable to all, and great benefit to her.
b.)
In addition, to any request she has made to change dates on the
weekends—I have cooperated with her completely.
c.)
I want it judicially noted and on the record, that the weekend in
question, was in fact, of this category where at contemnor ANAMARIA
BOUSTRED request, I did allow her to take care of my son’s on Thursday
night, so that she could see my son Richard on Friday morning so she
could see him on his birthday.
d.)
For these good faith, and gracious acts extended by me, I was met
with planned treason in an overt conspiracy to set me up for the issue
now at hand.
COUNTS
46.)
COUNT 1: CONTEMPT OF COURT--Violation of California Penal
Code 166(a)(4)
That on or about
March 9, 2003, contemnors ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and STEFFAN TICHATSKE did
knowingly, and willfully, with overt malice, violate a known valid court
order in direct violation of the law.
47.)
COUNT 2: CONSPIRACY--
VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE
§
182 et seq.—A FELONY, 1 YEAR JAIL; $10,000 FINE
That on or about
March 9, 2003, contemnors ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and STEFFAN TICHATSKE did
with full knowledge, conspire and collude to commit the acts and/or
omissions at the Homewood Ski Resort which did lead to acts and/or
omissions of assault and battery against me, and that they did plan this
and that it did culminate in the direct damage to me and my person, by
overt design in an ongoing enterprise to disenfranchise me, and as a
transfer of wealth scheme in collusion to have me arrested in violation
of my substantive rights or due process of law, without any protections
thereto.
48.)
COUNT 3: OVERT ACT— Penal Code
§ 182
Said contemnors along
with their attorney, did jointly conspire and have done same in the past
as proffered in the evidence so submitted upon the record to commit the
overt acts and/or omissions in an ongoing enterprise established between
them for the purposes for profit and reward, in order to divest me of my
substantive rights during a time of divorce and/or separation from my
wife contemnor ANAMARIE BOUSTRED.
49.)
COUNT 4: ASSAULT— Penal Code
§ 240,
§ 241 [Fine $2,000 and 1 Year
Jail]
On or about March 9,
2003, contemnors ANAMARIE BOUSTRED, in joint collusion and conspiracy
with contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE, did make an unlawful attempt to commit
violent injury upon me at Homewood Ski Resort in the County of
Placerville, State of California.
50.)
COUNT 5: BATTERY--- California Penal Code
§ 242,
§ 243 [$2,000 and 6 months
jail]
On or about March 9,
2003, contemnors ANAMARIE BOUSTRED, in joint collusion and conspiracy
with contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE, did commit the unlawful action of an
offensive touching against my person, at the Homewood Ski Resort, in the
County of Placerville, in the State of California.
51.)
COUNT 6: OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE--PENAL CODE
§ 96, 96.5, ART. I,
§ 15 CAL. CONST.—A FELONY and
PC § 98:
That for the ongoing
time period of July 12, 2002 to the present, said contemnor defendants
in direct overt collusion did in fact, obstruct and frustrate any
attempts of me obtaining any fairness, justice or protection of my
substantive rights and rights to due process of law filed and lawfully
served upon all parties in this matter and did in fact wilfully with
malice and aforethought; disenfranchise me, and aid defendant in her
overt and ongoing acts of Parental Alienation of my own children from
me, and place both me and my children in continued jeopardy by using the
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, for a
purpose that was never intended at law, without cause a direct violation
of Constitution of California, Article I, Section 1 AND an overt
violation of the concise rule of law and any decency or caring towards
me or my sons, and a direct violation of my rights, and the rights of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
"A democratic
society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central,
naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process.
Zeal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness
of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent
disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous
as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated process of criminal
Justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for
which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom the
relies for its vindication." McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
52.)
Title 18 USC ' 1510. Obstruction of criminal investigation.
(a) Whoever
willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent
the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal
statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator
shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term
"criminal investigator" means any individual duly authorized by a
department, agency, or armed force of the United States to conduct or
engage in investigations of or prosecutions for violations of the
criminal laws of the United States.
On or about March 9, 2003, contemnors did in fact, falsely charge me
with as to yet to be disclosed acts and/or omissions of which I am not,
nor ever had been guilty, and of which they did in fact, had an ongoing
enterprise to commit, in direct violation of the concise rule of law.
53.)
COUNT 7: PERJURY—California Penal Code
§ 118,
§ 126—Imprisonment in the
State Prison for Four Years.
That on or about
March 9, 2003, said contemnors did conspire to by force and stratagem,
effect an altercation between me and contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE, after
which, they had schemed to have Homewood employees and officials to be
present to “manage” and conveniently “witness” said altercation which
contemnor defendants did conspire to instigate in direct violation of
established court order. That after they did so, that they did knowing
that any allegations against me were false, they did file unknown
charges against me with full knowledge that said acts and/or omissions
were caused by them, and were under and by their design.
54.)
That said contemnor defendants knew and had substantial
knowledge of the facts of this matter and knew they were committing
egregious damages and offenses against me and my children.
55.)
It is a fact, that said contemnors on the dates mentioned,
for each act and/or omission presented; did have a mens rea, a guilty
mind, and as I have clearly shown, did fully intend and plan to commit
the above mentioned acts and/or omissions in direct violation of the
law.
56.)
It is a fact, that said contemnors on the dates mentioned,
for each act and/or omission presented; did in fact, commit an actus
reus, and did do the acts aforementioned in direct arrogance to the
concise rule of law.
57.)
It is a fact, that said contemnors on the dates mentioned,
for each act and/or omission presented; did in fact commit the corpus
delecti, and did harm me, and damage both me and my children, in direct
violation of the law for their own reasons for profit and reward as well
as other remunerations and/or scams and/or schemes.
III
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
58.)
I have a substantive right under the Constitution of California,
Article I, Section 8, for substantive due process of law.
"Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional mandate may not be
tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily
promote in some respects the best interest of the public." (Slote
v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367,; 9 NE 2D 12; 112 ALR 660)
Or, that "The State and its municipalities are prohibited from violating
substantive rights." (Owen v. City 445 U.S. 622 1980) "A
conspiracy is actionable under U.S.C. 1985, when there has been an
actual denial of due process." (Jennings v. Nester, 217
F2d 153, cert. denied 349 U.S. 958, 99 L.Ed.2d. 1281, 75 S.CT 888, U.S.
CT App, 7th Cir Ill.)
59.)
I have a substantive right to file this VERIFIED CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT against contemnors, and the District Attorney
as well as the above-mentioned judicial powers court is in fact,
obligated to provide me with redress of grievances.
Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806; 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2526,
2541 n.46 (1975)
this is a controlling case in a citizen's right to represent himself,
and the right to also have appointment of stand-by counsel to aid and
assist if and/or when (a) the accused requests help &.or (b) in the
event of termination of self-representation. Id. 2541 n. 14. (see
U. S. v. Dougherty 43 F.2d 1113, 1124-26)
See also:
Sanders v. United States 373 U.S. 1; 83 S.Ct.1068 (1963)
ensuring the constitutional right to a fair and thorough hearing of
petitioner's claims, due to the adversarial nature of the proceeding.
See
also:
"Here we interpret the California Penal and Government Codes to
authorize the district attorney to present or lay a complaint before a
magistrate as to a possible felony, but not to exclude or prohibit the
same act when performed by a private citizen. And see Western
Surgical Supply Co. v. Affleck, 1952, 110 Cal.App.2d 388, at
page 392, 242 P.2d 929, at page 931, where it is said of a then existing
Penal Code Section:
"The section *fn4 does not restrict the making of a complaint to any
certain person or individual; it may be by anyone having knowledge of
the offense charged." Cf. People v. Currie, 1911, 16
Cal.App. 731, 117 P. 941. [SEE Johnson v. MacCoy, (1960)
278 F.2d 37]
See also:
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to
be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
The hearing must be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
See also:
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of
fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses. E. g., ICC v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
227 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1913); Willner v. Committee on Character &
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104 (1963).
60.)
Your petitioner and complainant, has a right and perfect right to
file this verified criminal complaint for lawful adjudication. It is a
fact, that published California Penal Code
§ 806 states:
A proceeding for the
examination before a magistrate of a person on a charge of *** a felony
must be commenced by written complaint under oath subscribed by the
complainant and filed with the magistrate. Such complaint may be
verified on information and belief. When the complaint is used as a
pleading to which the defendant pleads guilty under Section 859(a) of
this code, the complaint shall contain the same allegations, including
the charge of prior conviction or convictions and, wherever applicable,
shall be construed and shall have substantially the same effected as
provided in this code for indictments and informations.
Further, that same code
§
849 is clear and concise as to your duties in this matter (pertinent
part):
§
849: Arrest without warrant; duty to take prisoner before magistrate
and file complaint; release from custody
“(a) When an arrest
is made without a warrant by a peace officer, or a private person…and
a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person shall be
laid before such magistrate.”
See Also:
§
837:
Arrests by private
persons. A private person may arrest another:
1.)
For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2.)
When the person arrested has committed a felony.
3.)
When a felony has been in fact committed and he has reasonable
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
61.)
Any failure to act on this verified criminal complaint will be a
direct violation of law and a direct substantive damage to me. As taken
from footnote 31 from BRISCOE v. LaHUE, 460 U.S. 325, 365
demonstrating that Congress, when enacting the Civil Rights legislation
was hostile to the considerable CORRUPTION of the Judiciary and the
Legal system:
See, e. g., Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 78 (Rep. Perry) ("Sheriffs, having
eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses
conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they
might be accomplices"); id., at 394 (Rep. Rainey) ("[T]he courts are in
many instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the
impartial administration of law and equity"); id., at App. 186 (Rep.
Platt) (judges exercise their "almost despotic powers . . . against
Republicans without regard to law or justice"); id., at App. 277 (Rep.
Porter) ("The outrages committed upon loyal men there are under the
forms of law. It can be summed up in one word: loyal men cannot obtain
justice in the courts . . ."); id., at 429 (referring to "prejudiced
juries and bribed judges"). See, BRISCOE v. LaHUE, 460
U.S. 325, 365-366;
62.)
Please also be under judicial notice of all government persons
under oath and affirmation:
CCP $ 446:
“Subscriptions of pleadings; necessity of verification; affidavit of
party; who may verify; verification by attorney or by officer of
corporation or agency; affidavit; assertion of truth under penalty of
perjury. '"Every pleading must be subscripted by the party or his or her
attorney. When the state, any county thereof, city, school district,
public agency, or public corporation, or any officer of the state, of
any county thereof, city, school district, district, public agency, or
plaintiff, the answer shall be verified unless an admission of the truth
of the complaint might subject the party to a criminal prosecution, or
unless a county thereof, city, school district, district, public agency,
or public corporation in his or her official capacity is defendant.
When the complaint is verified, the answer shall be verified. IN all
cases of a verification of a pleading, the affidavit of the party shall
state that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to the
matters which are therein stated on his or her information or belief,
and as to those matters that he or she believes to be true; and where a
pleading is verified, it shall be by the affidavit of a party, unless
the parties are absent from the county where the attorney has his or her
office, or from some cause unable to verify it, or the facts are within
the knowledge of his or her attorney or other person verifying the
same.”
63.)
Contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, did in fact, commit fraud upon me in
continually violating, ignoring and being insolent to a known court
order.
NEAL v.
SUPERIOR COURT
(NEAL) (06/22/01 - No. G028185)
Breach of contract
action alleging spouse did not comply with the terms of a family law
judgment and alleging spouse committed fraud in family court proceedings
belongs in family court that issued original judgment and not in civil
court.
64.)
The right to use force is secured under law in such circumstances
of which I was forced to suffer:
Justification does not make a criminal use of force lawful; if the use
of force is justified, it cannot be criminal at all. ...
The defense of justification (NY Penal Law art. 35) affirmatively
permits the use of force under certain circumstances (see, People
v. Watts, 57 N.Y.2d 299, 301, 456 N.Y.S.2d 677, 442 N.E.2d 1188;
see also, Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y.,
Book 39, Penal Law § 35.15, p. 93 [1975] ). ... The defense does not
operate to excuse a criminal act, nor does it negate a particular
element of a crime. Rather, by recognizing the use of force to be
privileged under certain circumstances, it renders such conduct entirely
lawful (see, People v. Taylor, 177 N.Y. 237, 245, 69 N.E.
534). ...
In this regard, the current statutory defense reflects the common-law
"right" of an individual to repel a threat ....
Defense [was] deemed a natural, inalienable right at common law. ...
If the conduct is justified, it simply cannot be the basis of ... any ..
crime.
People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541, 496 N.E.2d 202, 505
N.Y.S.2d 43 (1986).
65.)
It is a fact, that contemnor Steffan Tichatske did use “fighting
words” against me and did invade and assault me without my provocation
during his overt criminal acts and/or omissions in front of me and my
children in direct violation of law, and did overtly conspire to commit
these wilful acts against me, using inadvertency, surprise and prior
planning:
Legal definition of
'fighting words'
Fighting words
doctrine. The First Amendment doctrine that holds that certain
utterances are not constitutionally protected as free speech if they are
inherently likely to provoke a violent response from the audience.
N.A.A.C.P. v. Clairborne Hardware Co., Miss., 458 U.S. 886,
102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). Words which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace, having direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons
to whom, individually, remark is addressed. The test is what persons of
common intelligence would understand to be words likely to cause an
average addressee to fight. City of Seattle v. Camby, 104
Wash.2d 49, 701 P.2d 499, 500.
The "freedom of
speech" protected by the Constitution is not absolute at all times and
under all circumstances and there are well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which does not raise
any constitutional problem, including the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting words" which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct.
766, 86 L.Ed. 1031.
SOURCE: Black's Law
Dictionary, Sixth Edition
Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire,
the Supreme Court upheld for the first and only time a conviction for
fighting words and made that doctrine a rare exception to the First
Amendment's protection of free speech. Walter Chaplinsky, a member of
the Jehovah's Witnesses, called a city marshal a "damned Fascist" and "a
God damned racketeer." He was convicted of violating a New Hampshire law
that declared, "No person shall address any offensive, derisive or
annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other
public place." In affirming the state court, the Supreme Court announced
that the First Amendment does not protect "insulting or 'fighting'
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace."
66.)
This court cannot discriminate on the well-being of my children,
only because their parents are undergoing a divorce. This court must
rise above the mundane politically correct feminist criteria it has
followed and misguidedly implemented over the past years with disastrous
effects and must allow my children the same right of protection that I
as their father can afford them as any married couples children who have
the right to their own fathers sage care, custody, guidance and
protection:
“It was most accurately put by The U.S. Supreme Court in Clark vs.
Jeter [Citations Omitted] in 1988...."Established in a UNANIMOUS
ruling that it was UNCONSTITUTIONAL to treat a non marital child in a
way that was inferior to a marital child......The Supreme court said
"Time out you can't do that you cannot DISCRIMINATE against non-marital
children. THEY HAVE GOT EVERY BIT AS MUCH RIGHT TO THOSE TWO PARENTS
THAT THEY WERE BORN WITH AS A MARITAL CHILD.....So as a constitutional
matter, we would be very hard pressed to discriminate against the
non-marital child. I would go further and put it into pragmatic terms.
Most of the children who were born into a non-marital situation are not
the result of one night stands. These are parents who have known one
another other a long time. They have go a relationship in the majority
of cases actually living together, they are involved, both of them, with
respect to the child. Why in the world would we have a law that presumes
one of the parents is uninvolved.”
67.)
This VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT is true and proper and is a true
bill, and is actionable under the concise rule of law.
68.)
Contemnor’s are in fact, using the courts system, along with the
police and all their surrogate “Family Court” systems, for a purpose not
intended at law, to divest me of my rights, and to treat me as devoid of
my substantive rights and justice, in direct violation of law:
"Once a father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no
longer living with his child...could not be treated differently from a
currently married father living with his child." Quilloin v. Walcott,
99 S.Ct. 549, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56, (1978)
69.)
Contemnor’s, along with their surrogate court systems, are
engaged in collusion in a continuing pattern of “making a fraudulent
record” in which to overcome contemnor’s unclean hands, and acts of
contempt of court.
United States v. Russell (1973) 411 U.S. 423, 431-436, 36
L.Ed. 2d 366, 93 S.Ct. 1637 the Supreme Court noted: "Conduct of Law
Enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking the judicial process to
obtain a conviction" "California cases have treated this defense as
viable." (People v. Thoi (1989 4th Dist) 213 Cal.App. 3d
689, 696, 261 Cal.Rptr. 789.
70.)
It is a fact, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, has unclean hands
in this matter, and thereby, cannot make a valid claim against me, in
violation of an already established court order, and in light of her
past actions and overt immoralities.
The doctrine [of unclean hands] promotes justice by making a
[petitioner] answer for his own misconduct in the action. It prevents "a
wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression." [Petitioner]
must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will
be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim.
Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (E. & J. Gallo
Winery) (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970.
71.)
An INJUNCTION is the lawful and reasonable remedy in this matter
as I have no clear and available remedy against respondent’s in this
matter in their constant allegations being made against me for their own
altruistic purposes, which do not comport with the concise rule of law:
The county judge, in granting an injunction, acts in the place of the
district judge, and therefore the latter may dissolve the injunction as
if granted by himself. Custom Digest (212K164) Borland v. Thornton,
12 Cal. 440 (Cal.,1859)
See also:
Husband's harm was not monetary, but rather an injustice comparable to a
"false imprisonment" - defined as "the unlawful violation of the
personal liberty of another." Penal Code 236 - Civil same. "It is
immaterial that the deprivation may be temporary and nonfinal." Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
72.)
It is a fact, that contemnor and her surrogate court systems,
along with other state actors and/or agents and/or agencies, have shown
a propensity to have a clear conflict of interest and are not
disinterested parties in submitting any complaint and/or warrant against
me, as the proofs so submitted by exhibit here along with sworn
affidavit succinctly prove respondent’s unclean hands and a continued
“agenda” to grind an axe against me. Thereby, contemnors, by their
clearly proven hidden agenda to keep pushing this private civil matter,
into another venue in which to denigrate my position as the main natural
guardian of my children as per court order established under FL 16028
STIPULATION RE: TEMPROARY CUSTODY AND VISITATION AND ORDER THEREON,
thereby, it is a fact, that I cannot be under “legal commitment” or
under any warrant, until this matter is heard in accordance with the
substantive proofs and injunctive relief so prayed for.
More to the present point, a prosecutor may have a conflict if
institutional arrangements link the prosecutor too closely to a private
party, for example a victim, who in turn has a personal interest in the
defendant's prosecution and conviction. As Judge Friendly put it in
Wright v. United States, (supra) , 732 F.2d at page 1056, a
prosecutor "is not disinterested if he has, or is under the influence of
others who have, an axe to grind against the defendant." (Italics
added.) The tie that binds the prosecutor to an interested person may be
compelling though it derives from the prosecutor's institutional
objectives or obligations. Thus, in Young v. U.S. ex rel . Vuitton
et Fils S. A. (1987) 481 U.S. 787 [95 L. Ed. 2d 740, 107 S. Ct.
2124], the high court, pursuant to its supervisory authority, forbade a
private law firm from prosecuting a contempt proceeding on behalf of the
Government, because the firm, as a matter of legal ethics, bore the
"obligation of undivided loyalty" to its private client, Vuitton,
which in turn had a private pecuniary interest in the prosecution. ( Id.
at p. 805 [95 L. Ed. 2d at p. 757].) A public prosecutor must not be in
a position of "attempting at once to serve two masters," the People at
large and a private person or entity with its own particular interests
in the prosecution. ( Ganger v. Peyton (4th Cir. 1967) 379
F.2d 709, 714.) *fn8 Private influence, exercised through control over
the prosecutor's personal or institutional concerns, is a conflict of
interest, under section 1424, if it creates a reasonable possibility the
prosecutor may not act in an evenhanded manner.
As the majority holds, the trial court correctly found that the
prosecutor suffered a "conflict of interest" under Penal Code section
1424--i.e., there was "a reasonable possibility that the [district
attorney's] office may not exercise its discretionary function in an
evenhanded manner" ( People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal. 3d
141, 148 [193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5] [construing Pen. Code, §
1424].)
In Greer we suggested that "if the trial court determines
that a district attorney's participation in the filing of a criminal
complaint or the preliminary hearing on that complaint created a
potential for bias or the appearance of a conflict of interest, it may
conclude that the defendant was not 'legally committed' within the
meaning of Penal Code section 995, and the information should be set
aside." (Greer, (supra) , 19 Cal. 3d at p. 263, fn. 5.) We
expressly reserve the question whether availability of a remedy under
section 995 was affected by the addition of section 1424 and thus
express no opinion here regarding what standard would govern motions
brought under section 995.
The district attorney is an executive officer exercising executive
branch authority and generally is not subject to judicial supervision. (People
v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134.) A court does not have the
authority to direct the executive's choice of a representative, but may
disqualify a particular representative when his or her participation
would taint the proceeding. (People v. Superior Court (Greer)
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 265.) In this respect, the Legislature has
provided that a motion to disqualify may not be granted unless the
evidence establishes a conflict of interest sufficient to render it
unlikely that the defendant will receive a fair trial. (Pen. Code, §
1424, subd. (a)(1).)
People v. Eubanks, 14 Cal.4th 1282, 14 Cal.4th 580, 927
P.2d 310, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 (Cal. 12/23/1996)
73.)
It is a fact, that my children are suffering, due to her
capricious acts, surreptitious designs and stratagems, which calls into
question the competency of contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED ability to mother
and nurture my children.
"The simple fact of being a mother does not, by itself, indicate a
willingness or capacity to render a quality of care different than that
which a father can provide," the court said. State ex rel. Watts
v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 285.
74.)
75.)
a
IV
CONCLUSION
76.)
Jury trial is demanded in this matter, coming under the CRIMINAL
venue and jurisdiction of the above mentioned judicial powers court:
"Since the right to recover possession of real property was a right
ascertained and protected at Common Law. The 7th Amendment of the
Constitution entitles either party to demand a jury Trial in an action
to recover possession of real property in the S.C. for the Dist. of Col.
under 16-1501 of D.C. code."
77.)
I want it judicially noted and placed on the record, that “IF”
the above-mentioned County of Santa Cruz courts would uphold the concise
rule of law, and their own court orders, and would not conspire with,
and allow such a frivolous avenue to access the courts for any conspired
conflagration in their design and or artifice for attentions and claims
against me continually instituted by said respondents, with full
knowledge that said courts would act in their special interests
as their surrogate lawyer and/or court---and if same court would uphold
the integrity of their own court orders and hold said vexatious
respondents to the concise rule of law and agreements and/or contracts
and/or stipulations and/or their own court orders; then these
continued, sustained acts of barratry would not continuously occur
against me, and no further suits, complaints, nor filings would be
instituted by said respondents, whom have a sustained, palpable and
continued record in filing such false and/or fraudulent allegations
against your petitioner in this matter.
78.)
No conviction can legally issue in this matter:
Padreuita v. Lake Worth 367 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1979)
conviction obtained by fraud or perjury or other corrupt means is basis
for malicious prosecution.
79.)
Any and all state actor, agents, and/or agencies who in fact,
file any matter against me in relation to this matter does in fact, give
up all rights and claims to immunity, and will have no remedy at law for
any future action I may take against them:
“IMMUNITY NOT AVAILABLE See Milstein v. Cooley, supra at
257 F. 3d 1001:
“(ii) Filing a False Crime Report"[8] Filing a crime report as a
complaining witness or crime victim is analogous to filing an affidavit
or oath in support of an arrest warrant, see Kalina, 522
U.S. at 129-31, 118 S. Ct. 502; Morley, 175 F. 3d at 760.
80.)
Thereby, neither respondents’ nor any state actor, agent and/or
agency may contrive a conviction against me, until this matter is heard
before a jury trial:
Mooney v. Holohan 294 U.S. 103; 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935)
cannot contrive a conviction by the obfuscation of relevant facts.
81.)
It is a fact, that respondent’s are acting with malice against me
as well as my sons:
Central Machinery v. Williams 424 So.2d 201 (2nd DCA 1983)
malice is shown in commencement or contrivance of prosecution
82.)
It is clear and concise, that THERE IS A PALPABLE PATTERN OF
VEXATIOUS LITIGATION INVENTING CRISIS’S IN WHICH TO CHANGE THE POWER
STRUCTURE WHICH WAS SAGELY ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT UNDER FL 15 AS WELL
AS FL 16028 OF WHICH RESPONDENT’S ARE CLEARLY DISSATISFIED AND THEREBY
ARE SEEING BY DESIGN TO UNDERMINE:
Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. at 269 evidence of a trait,
habit or pattern of the witness similar to the facts at bar is relevant
and therefore admissible and cannot be withheld by the prosecution or
concealed from the jury.
83.)
It is a fact, that contemnor Steffan T has been formally barred
from my son’s school by the Administrative Pastor Mark Spurlock because
of his continued acts and/or omissions and immorality, of which Twin
Lakes Church School, located at 2701 Cabrillo College Drive, Aptos,
California, County of Santa Cruz refuses to have any part of.
84.)
It is also a fact, that my sons, are flourishing in our home
located at 210 Suncrest Drive, Soquel, California, County of Santa
Cruz. They have a good and wholesome and proper home, guidance and
moral upbringing, and are not in any danger nor will suffer any harm in
any way from me.
85.)
It is a fact, as proffered throughout the evidence so submitted
under subscription and verification of the truth, that contemnor
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED’s, continued designs artifice and stratagem, are
placing my children under palpable fear and danger, and such subterfuge
and fulminations are not healthy nor conducive to my children’s safety,
security or growth. These continued abuses, are a criminal intrusion
into the sanctity of our home, and a direct and exigent danger to same.
My son’s stability is the palpable issue here—and under the clean hands
doctrine, the weight of crimes and bad faith acts and/or omissions in
this matter by respondents is clearly demonstrated by the substantive
record so submitted into evidence of which this court is compelled to
act on our behalf in defense of our rights.
86.)
It is also a fact, and I want this court to judicially note and
place on the record the fact, that if this court denies said respondents
access to its court to continue said designs and subterfuge and
stratagems—then; upon closure of the above courts forum to hear said
respondents incessant vexatious claims, no further litigation will issue
in this matter upon abrogation of this courts open recourse to
respondents, and thereby, upon this fact, litigation will all but be
eradicated in this matter, which has to be recognized by this court
during a time of this states grave fiscal crisis.
V
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
87.)
Your petitioner, the accused and aggrieved party in this matter
comes now before Almighty God and this judicial powers court and
supplicates the following prayer for relief:
88.)
That an immediate INJUNCTION issue against said respondent’s
against any and all claim or criminal filing against me until this
VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT is lawfully heard before a jury of my peers
by trial by jury.
89.)
That a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued against contemnor
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED to prohibit her from seeing both my sons, as doing so
will endanger them both morally, and also place them in direct jeopardy
of any artifice or design she may intend to place as a trap against me,
thereby continually exposing my son to immorality, police, and continual
filing of needless charges against me; of which I, as well as they, now
have a direct fear of; and, is a needless danger to our lives and
safety; and,
90.)
That an immediate TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER also issue against
contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE who is acting in direct collusion with said
contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, and who I am in direct palpable fear and in
danger of; and,
91.)
That this VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT issue, and be palpably
acted upon in a timely manner under the concise rule of law.
92.)
That no other order, or requirement, or stipulation or ruling
will go forwards in this matter if and until this matter goes to trial
by jury, and a decision is made therein; and,
93.)
This court remit or provide to me any further justice and/or
relief that it deems just and/or proper in this matter.
Dated: March 10,
2003
_________________________________
Clive Boustred, -- AT LAW
In Propria Persona,
Sui Juris
Clive
Boustred
In Propria
Persona, Sui Juris
A Free Man,
Sovereign, Constitutional Rights Intact
210 Suncrest
Dr.
Soquel, CA
95073
(831) 476-4300
THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ
MARCH TERM
|
Clive
Boustred,
Petitioner,
Vs.
Anamaria
Boustred,
Respondent, |
CASE
NO.
DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF
CONTEMPT
|
I, Clive Boustred, declare that:
1.
I
am the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter.
2.
I
am in fact, in propria personal sui juris.
3.
I
represent that the facts and truths expressed in my Memorandum of Points
and Authorities are true and correct and sincerely held as they are in
fact the truth of this matter.
4.
That I have personal knowledge of the facts in this matter, that
I have read the contents of this document in the above entitled cause of
action, and know and understand them to be true.
5.
On or about 10:40 am I arrived at Homewood Ski Resort, County of
Placerville in the State of California. I met my wife who was alone at
the time just below the learning/kids ski slope, there were no
un-pleasantries at the meeting and I prepared Richard with his snowboard
and helped him get going. My wife and I discussed the day that she
would look after the boys and that I would go snowboarding, and that at
around 2:30 I would come and get Richard to take him up the mountain to
ski the beginner slopes. My wife and William then started walking up
the beginner ski slope where Richard was snowboarding.
As my wife reached
half way up the slope, Tichatschke in what appeared to be a planned
meeting skied down and kissed her in front of my boys. He then started
taking pictures of my boys. I rode the ski lift up and traversed across
to Tichatschke and asked him to please leave. He refused I informed him
that there was a clear court order baring him from contact with my
boys. He sneered at me and refused to leave, pushing his face towards
mine in a clear challenge and without any regard to William who was
sitting about two paces away. A scuffle ensued and Anamaria then ran
off. The attendant of the kids lift approached us and asked us to stop,
I agreed with him and picked up William and removed him from the scene.
Richard was already at the bottom of the hill. I put both of them in my
car to remove them from the situation. Within moments five Homewood
officials were there insisting that I do not leave. In told them that
my wife had previously tried to have me arrested and that the stress it
caused my son ended him up in the emergency room. I told the Homewood
official that I was going to act in the children’s interest and I left.
Another Homewood employee closed the parking lot gate on me as I was
leaving, I had to get out and open the gate and I left. Once away from
the commotion, I stopped and took care of my boys who were naturally
shaken from the situation. Both boys expresses extreme distain for
Tichatschke. I then took my boys to Burger King in Tahoe for lunch and
drove home stopping a number of times along the way to take care of the
boys.
On arriving at home
I took care of the boys and after tucking them in bet I worked through
the night preparing a contempt filing as I must protect these poor
little chaps.
6.
That I do believe I was set up, and this whole escapade on the date
aforementioned in this matter, was done for altruistic purposes to give
her the upper hand in a custody and property issue where she is in fact,
the guilty party with unclean hands.
7.
That I also believe that her attorney, Vicki Parry, has counseled said
contemnor respondent(s) to create and fulminate events which will give
her client the ability to file continued suits and/or actions against me
to harass both me and my sons’ in which to create havoc in our lives.
8.
That it is a fact, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED did have an
adulterous affair with contemnor
Steffen Tichatschke on or about January or February 2002 and continuing
on that point onwards, to the direct damage of me and my sons, as well
as my family.
9.
That said ANAMARIA BOUSTRED as well as contemnor STEFFAN
TICHATSKE were in fact, under legal obligation to me.
10.
That said contemnors were in fact they were under factual
contract and obligation to me not to lie and to live in accordance to
the concise rule of law, under the moral precepts and obligations as so
stated within the Holy Bible with complete integrity.
11.
It is a fact, that said contemnors do now cohabit together at
3320 Fairway Drive, Soquel, CA 95073 to the great humiliation and shame
of my sons, and our family.
Dated: March 10th,
2003
_________________________________
Clive Boustred, Sui Juris
210
Suncrest Dr.
Soquel, CA
95073
(831)
476-4300
VERIFICATION
County of Santa
Cruz ]
] ss.
State of
California ]
I, Clive Boustred,
being the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury as follows:
That the afore-going
Document(s), Affidavit(s), Declaration(s), and/or Materials, Id.,
including referenced and/or attached documents, and/or duplicates of
such documents are exacting copies of the originals in my/or my
counsel’s (specifically not American Bar Association, or professional
“Attorney’s”) possession. That I have read the foregoing document(s)
and attachments, and know and understand their contents, and having
personal knowledge, know them to be true. As to those matters submitted
therein upon information and/or belief, as to those matters, I also
believe them true.
Executed this tenth day of March, in
the Year of Our Lord and Savior Jesus the Christ Two-Thousand-Three.
SEAL:
_____________________________
Clive
Boustred – AT LAW
In Propria
Persona, Sui Juris
A Free Man,
Sovereign, Constitutional Rights Intact
Santa Cruz
Judicial District
210 Suncrest
Dr.
Soquel, California
[Zip Exempt]
SUBSCRIPTION
Subscribed this 10th
day of March, under exigent circumstances, before Almighty God, in the
Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, Two-Thousand-Three.
SEAL:
_____________________________
Clive
Boustred – AT LAW
In Propria
Persona, Sui Juris
A Free Man,
Sovereign, Constitutional Rights Intact
Reserving
All Rights, Giving Up None
The Superior Court, State of
California, in and for the County of Santa Cruz
MARCH Term
Clive Boustred, ]
] Case No. FL
Appellant/Petitioner ] CERTIFICATION OF
SERVICE/
vs. ] AFFIDAVIT OF
] PROOF OF SERVICE
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED ]
Respondents/Defendant ]
_______________________________________________] [CCP
§ 1013 and
§ 2015.5]
I, the undersigned hereby certify and
declare that I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the
within entitled cause of action; and, Further, hereby deposes and says:
that on the date signed below, I did serve UNDER AUTHORITY OF
APPELLANT/PETITIONER the attached document named:
1.) VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
31 Pages
__________________________________________________________________________
The aforesaid documents were served in
the following manner:
____By personal service IN COURT. I did
personally deliver the above-described documents at the address, or
addresses captioned below:
____By the U.S. Postal Service having
knowledge of the United States Mail Post
paid certified envelope, sealed by my
hand at _______________________.
Certified Number
__________________________________
____By phone communication transmission
[FAX], the material aforementioned on-line was sent at a total of ______
transmitted pages to Tel.#( ) -
____By sealed envelope, hand enclosed by
me and mailed to:
|
ANAMARIA
BOUSTRED
By lawful
Service to her Attorney Vicky Parry |
PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE
SANTA CRUZ
SUPERIOR COURT
701 Ocean
Street-Room 110
Santa Cruz,
CA 95060-4097 |
JUDGE SAMUEL S. STEVENS
SANTA CRUZ
SUPERIOR COURT
701 Ocean
Street-Room 110
Santa Cruz, CA 95060-4097 |
|
Vicky Parry
(Law Office of Vicky Parry)
100 Doyle
Street, STE G
Santa Cruz,
CA 95062 |
Steffan
Tichatske
3320 Fairway
Drive
Soquel, CA
95073 |
|
Further, I declare under penalty of
perjury knowing the laws thereof within the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct and that these documents were served by me
personally as stated above and/or mailed and sealed as stated above
within the California Republic.
DATED: March 10th, 2002
______________________________________
______AM/PM Name: -By
Lawful Service
Street:
City/State: Soquel, California
[95073]
TEL:
See also: "A
statute should be construed in harmony with the Common Law
unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the
Common Law." --United Bank vs. Mesa Nelson Co.,
121 Ariz 438, 590 P2d 1384, 25 U.C.C.RS 1113
Pro se litigant's pleadings should not be held to the same high
standards of perfection as lawyers. "Significantly, the Haines
case involved a pro se complaint - as does the present case -
which requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a
lawyer. Puckett v. Cox 456 F.2d 233, at 236
(1972)
"The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to
"the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her
children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property
right." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73
S.Ct. 840, 843, (1952)
Board of Trustees v. Municipal Court, 95
Cal.App.3d 322, the court wrote:
"It is only when a complaint with supporting affidavit is filed
can the municipal court be required to assume jurisdiction."
"This section
does not give the mother the absolute right to the custody of a
child of tender years. The qualifying clause, 'but other things
being equal,' still leaves a large measure of discretion with
the trial court. If the court finds that other things are not
equal, as it evidently did here, and there is any substantial
evidence to support such a finding, our inquiry is at an end."
SEE: Bush v. Bush, 81 Cal. App. 2d 695, 185 P.2d
38 (Cal.App.Dist.4 10/06/1947) Please note, because of said
orders finality under law, contemnors are attempting to
circumvent the courts sage findings under said order (See Page 2
thereon: Item 3: “The children shall share time with their
parents according to the following schedule: A. Mother shall
be responsible for the children Monday through Friday from
9:00AM until 6:00PM. If no school then return time is 3:00PM.
B. The parents shall alternate Saturday and Sunday each
weekend, one parent shall be responsible from Friday evening
until Saturday evening and the other parent from Saturday
evening until Sunday evening. C. Father shall be responsible
for the children all other unspecified time(s). [Father’s
custodial percentage works out to 60% majority custody].”
|
